In early sixteenth-century France, uses and conceptions of opposition were varied and shifting. This article analyses some complex and apparently paradoxical notions of opposites and identities found in two very different texts, Charles de Bovelles's Ars oppositorum (1511) and Maurice Sce`ve's De´lie (1544), examples of Latin prose philosophy and vernacular love lyric respectively. I argue that Sce`ve's poetry, like Bovelles's theory, reflects profoundly upon opposition, difference and identity. In particular, I focus in the De´lie upon relations of opposition and similarity between 'microcosm' and 'macrocosm', evoked through the poet's use of the 'jealous sun' topos. Bovelles explores models of opposition drawn from contrasting generic contexts, including Aristotelian logic and Cusa's mystical theology. However, both the De´lie and the Ars diverge in striking ways from strict categorizations of difference and identity (as typified by traditional dialectic). Both think through the relationships between antithetical modes of difference and other kinds, attempting to imagine even the co-existence of difference and identity. Both also present ways in which one relation of difference inflects another, and thus offer particularly complex accounts of dynamic interactions between opposites.
conceptions of graded differentiation, comparisons, and intermediaries; however, mystical thinkers like the fifteenth-century German cardinal Nicholas of Cusa nonetheless made extensive use of the discourse of logic. Cusa aimed to move beyond the logical consideration of opposites to an 'intellectual vision' of the coincidence of opposites, of a point beyond all distinctions, divisions and antitheses. The identification of opposites seemed to offer a means of apprehending God.
In the early decades of the sixteenth century, questions of God's otherness were crucial (as they would be in the doctrinal disputes of the Reformation). Letters exchanged between Marguerite de Navarre and the Bishop Guillaume Bric¸onnet in the 1520s made extensive and complex use of opposites, emphasizing God's absolute difference from man but also presenting a fusion of opposites which seems to express an anticipated union with the divine.
11 They, in common with French humanists including Charles de Bovelles and his teachers Jacques Lefe`vre d'É taples and Josse Clichtove, 12 were profoundly interested in Cusa's notion of the coincidence of opposites. 13 Therefore, in early sixteenth-century France, uses and conceptions of opposition were varied and shifting. This essay aims to analyse a profound concern with opposites in both Charles de Bovelles's Ars oppositorum (1511) 14 and Maurice Sce`ve's De´lie (1544). They belong to the rather different genres of Latin prose philosophy and vernacular love poetry but both texts, I would argue, reflect upon questions which their respective genres pose with respect to opposition and difference.
The very title of Bovelles's text -Ars oppositorum, or the Art of Oppositesannounces its central interest in opposites. Bovelles situates his discussion in relation to traditional logic, using terms from scholasticism and focusing his 'art' upon a 'square of opposites'; however, Bovelles's square differs radically from the Aristotelian one in its modes of opposition and in the type of knowledge which it creates. 15 Indeed Bovelles is deeply concerned with a particular sort of mysticism (as his title perhaps suggests through its 11 I discuss this aspect of the letters -and compare it to Sce`ve's paradoxical use of opposites -in my forthcoming Cosmos and Image in the Renaissance: French Love Lyric and Natural-Philosophical Poetry (Oxford, Legenda, 2008), pp. 142 -5, 154 -9. 12 On Bovelles's life, see Victor, Charles de Bovelles, chap. 1. The Ars was published together with a series of other works; it reworks and develops material from Bovelles's earlier In Artem oppositorum introductio (1501). 15 On Bovelles's Ars, see Maurice de Gandillac, 'L'Art bovilien des oppose´s', in Charles de Bovelles en son cinquie`me centenaire 1479-1979: actes du colloque international tenu a`Noyon les 14 -15 -16 septembre 1979, ed. by JeanClaude Margolin (Paris, Guy Tre´daniel, É ditions de la Maisnie, 1982) , pp. 157 -70; Victor, Charles de Bovelles, chap. 5; Jean-Claude Margolin, 'Sur L'Art des oppose´s de Bovelles', in Logique et Litte´rature a`la Renaissance: actes du colloque de la Baume-les-Aix, Universite´de Provence, 16-18 septembre 1991, ed. by Marie-Luce Demonet-Launay and Andre´Tournon (Paris, Champion, 1994) , pp. 5-16; Murphy, 'Bovelles. Sce`ve. Bruno. Antiperistasis ', Allegorica, 14 (1993) , 39-52. evocation of the 'art' of the thirteenth-century Majorcan philosopher Ramo´n Lull), 16 and more specifically with mystical notions of opposition. By contrast, love lyric of course does not take opposition to be its primary object of representation. However, Petrarchan rhetoric made extensive use of antithesis, oxymoron, contradiction, and paradox.
17 Furthermore, arguably desire and difference are a priori bound up with one another in love lyric; thus poets sometimes use the word contraire (a term which also denoted a mode of opposition in logic) to refer to the lady who refused the poet's desire. 18 In addition, love lyric often throws up questions concerning not only the nature of the difference between the je and the lady but also that of the similarity between the lady and the celestial, or that of a difference within the je.
19 For Sce`ve in particular, love appears to be bound up with particularly complex relations of difference, similarity, and identity. Finally, Sce`ve seems to reflect critically upon the notions of difference and opposition studied at university: these should not be considered irrelevant to poetry, since the concepts taught in dialectic classes were supposed to be suitable for discourse upon any topic, and the popular new humanist textbook, Rudolph Agricola's De inventione dialectica, made extensive use of literary examples to explain linguistic practice.
20
Stephen Murphy's fascinating article, 'Bovelles. Sce`ve. Bruno. Antiperistasis', pointed to convergences between Bovelles and Petrarchist poetry in general as well as Sce`ve's De´lie in particular, noting that in both Bovelles's theory and also Petrarchist poetry opposites intensify each other; for example, in the case of poetry, the lover's mal means that his bien increases. 17 Colie discusses the relationship between love poetry and opposition (Paradoxia Epidemica, especially chap. 3).
18 Edmond Huguet, Dictionnaire de la langue française du seizie`me sie`cle, 7 vols (Paris, Honore´Champion, 1925 -), II, 487 -8.
19 I refer to the je not only to avoid implying any simple equation between lived and poetic experience but also because personal pronouns are used extremely frequently in the De´lie. In addition, the term je (rather than, for example, 'subject') highlights the generic difference of the De´lie from the Ars; this contrast between the experience of a human individual and an abstract human intellectus will be important in the further development of my current analysis in 'Difference, Cognition, and Causality: Maurice Sce`ve's De´lie and Charles de Bovelles's Ars oppositorum', forthcoming in French Studies (2009). 20 The new focus upon persuasive arguments (rather than simply demonstrative ones) lessened the division between dialectic and rhetoric, and therefore between dialectic and imaginative texts, including poetry which tended to be thought of as a 'seconde rhe´torique'. Sce`ve's education was probably affected by the humanist reorientation of dialectic, since he was born 'towards the beginning of the century' and took his doctor's degree before 1540: see I. D. McFarlane's introduction to his edition of the De´lie (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 6. It has been argued that Renaissance poetry is marked by the structures of thought communicated in logic classes. On dialectic in the De´lie, see Jerry Nash, 'Logic and Lyric: Poetic Closure in Sce`ve's De´lie ', French Studies, xxxviii (1984) Murphy further suggests that the De´lie is particularly interesting because of its oft-noted evocation of simultaneous opposites (rather than cyclical ones), such as 'heureux souffrir ' (pp. 43-46) . Murphy does not pursue his discussion of opposition in the De´lie and the Ars, since he has other concerns; however, they do merit further analysis.
Both texts are dense and difficult, and it is not possible here to run through Bovelles's argument step-by-step, nor to give a full account of all the opposites and identities of the De´lie. Instead I will focus on aspects of both texts which problematize notions of opposition, difference, and identity in striking ways, often disrupting the reading process by troubling the identities and differences which have thus far been established, and by seeming to make contrasting modes of difference co-exist. I do not intend to claim that Sce`ve was directly influenced by Bovelles but rather that the two texts represent two possible modes of conceiving opposition which are distinct yet overlap in some central concerns. I will argue that both texts conceive opposition in complex ways, expressing a particular interest in the relationships between antithetical modes of difference and other kinds of difference or similarity.
Diverging from Aristotelian tradition, Bovelles inserts into his square of opposites not propositions but single terms such as 'light', 'darkness', 'God', 'nothing', 'truth', 'falsity'. Despite the diversity of the pairs of terms, for Bovelles, one pair of opposites leads to knowledge about another: as he explains in his dedicatory address to Franc¸ois de Melun, this is due to the 'coincidence' and 'proportion' of all opposites which give rise to 'a productive development of discourse'. 22 Thus consideration of oppositions reveals knowledge about many disciplines because knowledge about one discipline can be gleaned from another (p. 32).
23 This contrasts sharply with the claims of the Aristotelian square to reveal knowledge about any discipline precisely by analysing the specificities of the mode of opposition in question.
Furthermore, Bovelles states from the outset that it is even possible to use the art of opposites to approach divine 'mysteries' (p. 32).
24 Opposites discussed include Deus (God) and nichil (nothing). Furthermore, when Bovelles proceeds from one pair of opposites to another, the statements produced about the second pair often recall the coincidence of opposites 22 'Fecunda quedam orationis propagatio': Bovelles, L'Art des oppose´s, ed. and trans. by Pierre Magnard (Paris, J. Vrin, 1984), p. 32. I refer throughout to Magnard's edition; translations into English are my own, although I have consulted Magnard's French translation. Insofar as he implies the conjunction of knowledge and discourse, Bovelles's attitude to Aristotelian logic can be compared with that of logicians like Petrus Ramus. Bovelles repeats the idea of the productivity of his square: 'Et per hec opposita equidistantiam et angulum sive intersectionem, latissime de cunctis oppositis philosophari' ('And through these opposites, parallelism and the angle or intersection, one can philosophize extensively on all opposites', p. 66, my italics).
23
On gaining knowledge about different disciplines from the square, see in particular chap. 17.
24
Later in Bovelles's career, he moved further towards speculative theology: see Victor, Charles de Bovelles, pp. 54 -5.
familiar from mystical theology. For example, Bovelles progresses from 'knowledge' about truth and falsity to 'knowledge' about light and darkness; while the statement that 'truth is false falseness' can be interpreted as expressing commonsensical meaning, the statement that 'light is dark darkness' cannot (pp. 120-22) . 25 The opposition between light and darkness is broken down.
Moreover, Bovelles's definition of opposition itself is complex and shifting. He states in the opening paragraph of his first chapter that for him oppositio (opposition) has a 'broader meaning' than for the dialecticians. His conception of opposition is here expressed in spatial terms which are characteristic of much of his discussion throughout the Ars.
26 The more inclusive definition is necessary since, 'although most things in existence seem not to have received from nature any contrariety or dispute, they are nevertheless called opposites with respect to one another for the sole reason of their mutual relation'.
27 Opposita are terms in relation with one another, and oppositio can mean simply the relation of two things to one another (or the placing of two things in relation to one another). However, many of the pairs of terms (opposita) which Bovelles considers are apparently antithetical ones -pairs such as light and darkness. Furthermore, when oppositio is used to refer to the bringing-together of antithetical terms, it is repeatedly aligned with terms such as lis (conflict), bellum (war), and discordia (discord) (p. 56 and passim). Here oppositio signifies antithetical and conflictual difference. Oppositio denotes, on the one hand, any relationship between two terms, and, on the other hand, conflictual difference between two terms, 'discord' and 'war'. The term opposita carries similarly contrasting meanings. In striking contrast to Aristotelian logic, modes of opposition seem to resist categorization to such an extent that Bovelles's vocabulary of opposition does not distinguish conflictual antithetical difference from other kinds, and the conceptual boundaries of opposition are troubled.
Furthermore, alongside pairs of terms such as 'light' and 'darkness', Bovelles discusses the very terms 'same' (idem) and 'opposite' (oppositum), 25 In 1526 Bovelles published a Divinae caliginis liber (Book of Divine Darkness), which is deeply indebted to Pseudo-Denys. See Jan Miernowski, Le Dieu ne´ant: the´ologies ne´gatives a`l'aube des temps modernes (New York, Brill, 1998), chap. 5; Jean-Claude Margolin, 'Ombre et lumie`re dans la pense´e de Charles de Bovelles', in Ombres et lumie`res de la Renaissance: colloque du Puy-en-Velay (8 et 9 septembre 1997) (Puy, Conseil ge´ne´ral de la Haute-Loire, 1998), pp. 25 -42.
26 '[W]e, by contrast, wish in this work to give a broader meaning to the term of opposition, in applying it to all those things, I say, which in any way you like are placed facing each other either by nature or by the understanding (intellectus), or which in whatever way you please are returned/referred each to the other, or which [taken] from their own area are placed facing each other, are turned back towards each other and as if by the distance of some diameter look at each other': 'Nos vero hoc in proposito latius oppositionis nomen extendi volumus, ad ea inquam cuncta, que quomodovis contra sese aut natura aut intellectu statuuntur, queve quomodolibet ad alterutrum referuntur, queve regione sui et adversum se collocantur, in seinvicem convertuntur et velut quodam diametri interstitio in alterutrum spectant' (p. 36, my italics).
27 'Nam tametsi pleraque entium nullam natura aut contrarietatem aut pugnantiam sortita esse videantur, opposita tamen invicem sola mutue relationis causa vocantur' (p. 36).
giving rise to complex statements such as 'if the same is in the opposite, the opposite will be in the same'. 28 The notion of the same being in the opposite and vice versa then itself becomes defined as 'opposition', and is distinguished from identity (p. 56). However, this binary will itself be broken down so that, for example, Bovelles states that the 'opposition' of opposites 'is their identity' (p. 76).
As a love lyricist, unsurprisingly Sce`ve does not often use the vocabulary of opposition. However, like some other love lyricists, he does use the term contraire, which implies absolute difference both generally and also in logic. 29 In Sce`ve's D124, the lady is referred to as Apollo's contraire (rather than that of the je, as would be more usual) 30 in a poem which, following the jealous sun topos, discusses the lady's relationship to the sun (rather than directly representing her relationship with the je). The vocabulary of antithetical difference is used here for a relation which apparently involves similarity and a more nuanced type of difference: Apollo is evoked as the jealous sun who hides his light in response to the lady's superior light, yet, while the lady may be superior to the sun, they are also similar since both supposedly emit a bright light. Thus, as in Bovelles's writing, antithetical difference seems to overlap with other sorts of difference, as if absolute difference and similarity might somehow co-exist.
The relationship between the lady and the sun (or other cosmic light-sources) is at issue in other dizains too, 31 and I will focus upon these in this essay. Studies of the cosmos in the De´lie have tended to focus upon the relationship between the je and the cosmos (rather than the lady and the cosmos); 32 however the relationship between the lady and the sun is particularly interesting for my purposes here because it involves complex relations of difference, similarity, and identity. Critics of the De´lie -and of love lyric more generallyoften refer to the relationship between the human and the cosmic as if its nature were self-evident, as if it were predetermined by a fixed sixteenthcentury conception of the 'microcosm': cosmic images are explained with 28 'Et ita in cunctis reperies, si idem eodem fuerit, fore simul oppositum in opposito, et si idem in opposito, oppositum fore in eodem' (p. 54).
29
See for example Peter of Spain's maxim 'posito uno contrariorum removetur reliquum ab eodem' ('if we posit one contrary, that excludes the other', p. 72; see also p. 6). Contraire can also have a spatial meaning; together with Sce`ve's cosmic imagery, this suggests that Sce`ve, like Bovelles, thinks of opposition in spatial terms. See Algirdan Julien Greimas and Teresa Mary Keane, Dictionnaire du moyen français: la Renaissance (Paris, Larousse, 1992), p. 142.
30
In Huguet's examples of the term in love lyric (see note 18), the lady is always ma contraire. In his Harmonie divine et subjectivite´poe´tique chez Maurice Sce`ve (Geneva, Droz, 2001), James Helgeson focuses upon the relationship between the cosmos and the je, as his title suggests. The lady is part of the subject's relationship with the world, and the subject attempts to force her into the mould of cosmic harmony. Hans Staub focused upon the cognitive movement into the world of the je, and considered the lady to be united with the je in this movement: Le Curieux De´sir: Sce`ve et Peletier du Mans, poe`tes de la connaissance (Geneva, Droz, 1967), chap. 2. reference to a relationship between the human and the cosmic which, apparently, was universally interpreted to be one of similarity.
33 This is suggested more explicitly by Hans Staub's use of a quotation from Cusa to frame his reading of the De´lie: the quotation states that the human behaves like the cosmic but 'in a human way', humaniter.
34 However, while cosmic images in sixteenth-century poetry may be ontologically grounded in a relationship between the human and the cosmic, as Jean Rousset has suggested, 35 it does not follow that this relationship was conceived in only one fixed and stable way, as a relationship of similarity. Instead, I suggest that the De´lie interrogates the roles in this relationship of difference, similarity, and identity. 36 In many dizains, the poet shifts between, on the one hand, evoking De´lie and the sun as separate beings and discussing their differences, and, on the other hand, identifying and conflating the lady and the sun. Sometimes the relationship between the lady and the cosmic light-source is one of similarity or analogy. For example, in D24 the relationship of the je with the lady resembles the relationship which human beings in general have with cosmic light: the je is dazzled by the lady's light just as the human eye is dazzled by cosmic light.
Quand l'oeil aux champs est d'esclairs esblouy, Luy semble nuict quelque part, qu'il regarde: Puis peu a`peu de clarte´resjouy, Des soubdains feuz du Ciel se contregarde.
Mais moy conduict dessoubs la sauvegarde De ceste tienne, et unique lumiere, Qui m'offusca ma lyesse premiere Par tes doulx rays aiguement suyviz, Ne me pers plus en veue coustumiere.
Car seulement pour t'adorer je vis.
37
The first four lines describe the effects of cosmic light, then the final six lines evoke those of the lady's 'light'. There is no confusion between the cosmic light and the lady, especially since the je distinguishes between their effects using 33 For example, in his Love Aesthetics of Maurice Sce`ve: Poetry and Struggle (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), Jerry C. Nash considers Sce`ve's solar and lunar images to represent a triumph of clarity over obscurity, thus implying that cosmic light is simply a symbol of human cognition, thanks to the similarity between the two; cf. my discussions of the relationship between light and cognition in Cosmos and Image, Part 2, and in 'Difference, Cognition, and Causality'. Critics often refer to the 'universe' of the De´lie to mean the subjective 'world' of the lover, thus suggesting that the cosmos is not a concern but simply a source of images. See also Fenoaltea, for whom the role of the cosmos is to illustrate and clarify the lover's experience: 'Si haulte architecture', chap. 'mais': the light and the lady are said to be similar but they are not identified with one another; each has its own separate place in the cosmic realm and the human realm respectively. In the same way, in D386, the sun's rays resemble De´lie's hair, and its dazzling midday strength resembles her dazzling eyes, but De´lie and the sun are not represented as being identical:
Quand Apollo apre`s l'Aulbe vermeille Poulse le bout de ses rayons dorez, Semble a`mon oeil, qui lors point ne sommeille, Veoir les cheveulx, de ce Monde adorez, Qui par leurs noudz de mes mortz decorez M'ont a`ce joug jusqu'a`ma fin conduyct.
Et quand apre`s a`plaine face il luyt, Il m'est advis, que je voy clerement Les yeulx, desquelz la clarte´tant me nuyt, Qu'elle esblouyt ma veue entierement.
In these dizains, De´lie's resemblance to the sun is congruent with a conception of the human -cosmos relation as one of analogy or similarity: the lady is apparently a human equivalent of the sun, performing a similar role for the poetic subject as the sun performs in the cosmos. These dizains fit with the notion that the human is similar to the cosmic, and with Staub's Cusan reading in which the human resembles the universe but 'in a human way'.
However, the De´lie does not always reiterate this particular conception of the relationship between the human realm and the cosmos. In other dizains the lady and the sun are conflated. For example, D92 opens in a similar manner to D386 in that the sun makes it seem to the je as if he sees the lady who startles and dazzles him; as in D386, the sun is similar to De´lie yet separate from her. However, when, in the final two lines of the dizain, the poet evokes 'tel Soleil', these words could denote the solar body itself or could have come to refer to the lady: Sur nostre chef gettant Phebus ses rayz, Faisoit bouillir de son cler jour la None: Advis me fut de veoir en son taint frais Celle, de qui la rencontre m'estonne, De qui la voix si fort en l'ame tonne: Que ne puis d'elle un seul doulx mot ouir: Et de qui l'oeil vient ma veue esblouir, Tant qu'aultre n'est, fors elle, a`mes yeux belle.
Me pourra donc tel Soleil resjouir, Quand tout Mydi m'est nuict, voire eternelle?
In the opening lines, the je tells us that when the sun shines in the late afternoon ('la None'), he imagines that he sees the lady; then, in the final two lines, he wonders whether 'such a sun' ('tel Soleil') can bring him joy, when every midday is to him eternal night. The argument of these final two lines might be construed as follows: the poet will be unable to gain joy from the sun (the cosmic body) because of the love for his lady which he has evoked in lines 3-8. In this reading, 'tel Soleil' would refer to the solar cosmic body, as one would usually expect. However, the potential absence of joy in 'tel Soleil' results from the fact that 'tout Mydi m'est nuict, voire eternelle' (l. 10): therefore, since literal cosmic midday could not in any real sense be either night or eternal, 'tel Soleil' does not seem to refer literally to the cosmic solar body. In addition, the idea of midday being night recalls the notion of a light so dazzling that it casts the je into darkness, and such a light figures in the De´lie as an image of the lady, for example in D386 (quoted on previous page) and D51 (quoted below); indeed in D92 itself the lady has been evoked in her dazzling role (l. 7), whereas the actual cosmic sun was in 'la None', the fourth quarter of the day, rather than at midday. So, 'tel Soleil' seems to refer to the lady whose gaze might dazzle the poet into darkness, or 'turn "midday" into "night"'. Moreover, in D92 it is only the je who is said to experience midday as eternal night ('tout Mydi m'est nuict'), which suggests that it is his 'sun' -the lady -who is here referred to as a 'Soleil'. On the other hand, in this particular dizain, the lady has not previously been referred to as a sun, and her dazzling gaze has not been foregrounded but rather features as only one of a list of her attributes: thus the reader does not necessarily have in mind an image of her as a sun, whereas the poet has definitely created an image of the cosmic sun casting its rays. So, by contrast with references to the sun in dizains 24 and 386, the expression 'tel Soleil' does not refer unambiguously to either the sun or the lady.
Thus, in D92, 'tel Soleil' has attributes of the lady (casting the je into darkness), so that 'Soleil' equivocates between referring to the solar cosmic body or to the supposedly human lady. Although D92 begins by comparing the lady and the sun to one another, by the end of the dizain there seems to be only one 'sun'. There is not an equivalent 'universe' in the human realm which resembles the cosmic 'universe': this is not an analogic relation between cosmos and human in which the sun and the lady would be similar yet nonetheless clearly maintain their difference. Instead, the macrocosm and the microcosm are collapsed onto the same signifiers. The sun and the lady of whom the sun reminds the je seem to become one. In the same way, D51 begins by explicitly comparing the sun and the lady (or, at least, 'si grand beaulte´'), but then proceeds to a discussion which is apparently of the lady, yet which uses so much solar vocabulary that the sun and the lady seem to have merged into one, or to occupy the same place:
Si grand beaulte´, mais bien si grand merveille, Qui a`Phebus offusque sa clarte´, Soit que je sois present, ou escarte´, De sorte l'ame en sa lueur m'esveille, Qu'il m'est advis en dormant, que je veille, Et qu'en son jour un espoir je prevoy, Qui de bien brief, sans deslay, ou renvoy, M'esclercira mes pense´es funebres.
Mais quand sa face en son Mydy je voy, A tous clarte´, et a`moy rend tenebres.
Here the lady is not cosmic 'in a human way' (humaniter) but literally is the cosmic.
Of course it is common poetic practice for the second pole of a comparison to be implicit and unexplained so that, for example, a poet says 'sun' and means 'lady'. However, Sce`ve moves between explicit comparison of the lady and the sun -implying their similarity yet separate existences -and implicit 'comparison', or conflation of the lady and the sun onto the same signifiers. In other words, it is not simply that Sce`ve uses solar vocabulary for his lady: rather he evokes and compares the sun and the lady, then confuses them so that the solar vocabulary might refer to either or both. He compares them, referring to their differences and similarities, but then conflates them, making it difficult to distinguish between them. Thus, I would suggest that, rather than being ontologically grounded in the notion of a relationship between the human and the cosmos based in similarity, Sce`ve's cosmic images explore the nature of that relationship by reconstruing it as one of similarity and difference, then as one of identity. This undermines any sense that one should be able to define relationships in terms of difference or of identity exclusively. As for Bovelles, difference and identity do not seem as different from one another as might be expected.
Other relationships of difference and similarity are also implicated in the shifting relations between the lady and the sun. If we accept that the solar signifiers in D92 refer to the sun as well as to the lady, then the midday sun is conflated with a different -even opposite (in the sense of antithetical) -point on the cosmic cycle: night. Antithetical differences are broken down, recalling Bovelles's discussion of light as dark darkness. Furthermore, in D92 these opposites are in turn conflated with the eternal, which one can think of as 'containing' all temporal points. The 'sun' thus merges with its opposite as a result of the equivocation of 'soleil' between referring to the sun and referring to the lady. In other words, the lady's shifting relationship of similarity and sameness to the sun in a sense changes the sun: that is, as a result of being in a shifting relation of difference with the lady, the sun becomes different, or opposed to itself.
A similar process is arguably at work in D124, the dizain in which the lady is referred to as Apollo's 'contraire':
Si Apollo restrainct ses raiz dorez, Se marrissant tout honteux soubz la nue, C'est par les tiens de ce Monde adorez, Desquelz l'or pur sa clarte´diminue.
Parquoy soubdain, qu'icy tu es venue, Estant sur toy, son contraire, envieux, A congele´ce Brouas pluvieux, Pour contrelustre a`ta divine face. Mais ton tainct frais vainct la neige des cieulx, Comme le jour la clere nuict efface.
The lady and the sun, Apollo, are similar in their brightness, although the lady's brightness is superior. Furthermore, the lady is, in line 10, compared to the sun, or at least to 'le jour'. However, as we have seen, despite her similarity to Apollo, the lady is described as Apollo's 'opposite', his 'contraire' (l. 6). Moreover, it is suggested that the lady's brightness diminishes that of Apollo. Finally, when the lady is aligned with 'le jour', the sun (Apollo) is implicitly aligned with the 'neige des cieulx' and even 'la clere nuict'. Despite being similar to the lady, Apollo does seem to become something like her 'contraire' and, moreover, is also something like his own 'contraire', the night. Once again, a dizain opens by referring to a relationship of similarity between the lady and the sun, yet by the end of the dizain solar signifiers (in this case jour) have come to refer to the lady, and the sun has implicitly become something different from -or even opposite to -itself: complex relations of difference are introduced into the sun by the same token that they exist in the relationship between the lady and the sun. As in D92, a resemblance between the lady and the sun undermines the sun's sameness to itself and perhaps also its opposition to night.
By occupying the place of the sun, the lady troubles the cosmic hierarchy in which the solar should be higher than the human and opposite to the night. Bovelles also connects oppositio (in its conflictual sense) with undoing cosmic hierarchy: oppositio reverses the hierarchy so that earth is high and fire is low (p. 58). Moreover, the interaction between different pairs of terms, which I have described in the De´lie, is discussed more explicitly by Bovelles. In the De´lie, the relations of difference between one pair of terms (the sun and the lady) affect the relationship between another pair (night and day). Bovelles's text is also concerned with how pairs of 'opposites' function and interact: in the Ars oppositorum, the relation between a pair of opposites is redefined by their relation to another pair of opposites. Bovelles describes how opposites -such as Deus (God) and nichil (nothing) -partake not only in a relation of opposition to each other but also in relations of identity with other terms: thus Deus is in a relation of identity with esse (being), and nichil is in a relation of sameness with non esse (not being). Bovelles's 'square' represents these relationships diagrammatically, as shown in Fig. 1 . Deus and esse are linked by a 'line of identity', as are nichil and non esse. By contrast, 'lines of opposition' link Deus to non esse, and nichil to esse (p. 64). Bovelles explains that these 'lines of opposition' give rise to four more, since the two angles formed by their intersections form four further lines of opposition (p. 66). However, the relations of 'opposition' represented by these additional lines 'oppose' Deus and esse, which are also joined by a 'line of identity', and which one would not expect to be opposed (at least if 'opposition' is conceived, as it is here, as diversity and discord rather than simply as a relation):
Similarly all the lines which form an angle, like those which go from God to both being and non-being, or from nothing to both being and non-being, or from God and nothing to being, or from God and nothing to non-being, are called lines of opposition, diversity, and discord. 39 Thus, the relation of identity or opposition between a pair of terms is altered by the placing of that pair in a relation with another pair, so that some terms are 'joined' to one another by both identity and opposition. This is rather like the process I have analysed in the De´lie. Indeed one might place the pairs je and 'lady', and 'sun' (or iour) and 'night' (or 'darkness') into Bovelles's square in place of Deus and nichil, and esse and non esse; after all, Bovelles suggests that his Ars can be used to find knowledge about all sorts of pairs of opposites. In Fig. 2, I have joined 'lady' and 'sun' with a 'line of identity', since these two terms are similar and often conflated; likewise je and 'night' can be joined with a 'line of identity', since the je often bemoans his state of darkness which results from his encounter with the lady -sun. While 'identity' seems too strong a term for those instances where the lady and the sun (or je and darkness) are simply said to be alike, it is appropriate for the instances where they are conflated. As a result of inserting these terms into the square, the lady and the sun become joined simultaneously by identity and by opposition, a process similar to that which occurs in the very different context of the De´lie. One could also place 'sun' and 'night' into the square so that they were joined by lines of both opposition and identity. Therefore opposition functions in similarly paradoxical ways in both the theoretical text and the poetic one: both Sce`ve and Bovelles suggest that, as part of a dynamic relation between pairs of terms, opposition can co-exist with identity, and the existence of one relation can create the other.
Bovelles, as we have seen, explicitly states that the Ars might be used to explore divine mysteries; its complex conceptions of difference are apparently driven, in part at least, by the desire to express the divine. In the De´lie, an imaginative form of thinking divinity may also be at play: it seems to be the lady who introduces complex differences into the world, and this lady, like all Petrarchist ladies, has attributes not only of the cosmic but also of the divine. Indeed, the use of Biblical and theological language to describe her and the lover's relationship with her is arguably more striking than in other contemporary French love lyric. 40 In addition, as we have seen, in D92, the conflated opposites of day and night are in turn conflated with the eternal: 'Me pourra donc tel Soleil resjouir,/ Quand tout Mydi m'est nuict, voire eternelle?' I would also argue that both the Ars and the De´lie also express a deep interest in the relationship between difference and the human subject, and in the respective roles of nature and human cognition in establishing differences. These questions require further discussion, and I address them elsewhere. 41 In this particular study, I hope that I have demonstrated that the De´lie and the Ars share an interest in undermining antithetical difference, in confusing it with other modes of difference, and ultimately in challenging the way we conceive of differences and identities.
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Human cognition and the human subject will be the focus of my 'Difference, Cognition, and Causality'. I examine the relationship between divinity and opposition in the De´lie in Cosmos and Image, Part 2.
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